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We the People: The Fourteenth Amendment and the Supreme Court. By
MICHAEL J. PERRY. [Oxford: Oxford University Press. 1999. viii and
258 pp. Hardback £25.00. ISBN 0-19-512362-X.]
NEVER one to shirk a challenge, Michael Perry has taken on the difficult
task of investigating whether, as charged by a number of prominent social
and legal commentators, "the modern Supreme Court, in the name of the
Fourteenth Amendment [to the US Constitution], [has] usurped
prerogatives and made choices that properly belong to the electorally
accountable representatives of the American people," and if so, to what
extent (p. 8). Perry makes no attempt to address every facet of Fourteenth
Amendment doctrine, but instead focuses his discussion on some of the
most controversial topics: racial segregation, affirmative action,
discrimination on the basis of sex and sexuality, abortion and physician-
assisted suicide.
Upon being presented with Perry's enunciated goals, the reader's first
thought is that it is impossible to produce a single, cohesive theory
incorporating such a range of issues unless one engages in gross
generalizations or disregards important factual or legal distinctions. Perry,
however, falls prey to neither of these shortcomings. Instead, he develops a
theory of the Fourteenth Amendment that, while not without its flaws,
effectively rebuts claims that the US Supreme Court has forsaken its
constitutional role and taken up judicial politics as a usual practice.
Perry begins by identifying two types of US constitutional norms: those
that were actually established by "We the people" when the textual
provisions in question were enacted and those that may not have ever been
established by "We the people" but which have, nevertheless, become
"constitutional bedrock" through continued usage. Perry claims that critics
of recent US Supreme Court practice cannot dispute the "constitutional
bedrock" aspect of his theory, since Robert Bork, one of the leading critics
of the Court, has himself written that there are some principles that, while
not having been originally enacted by the framers of any particular piece of
constitutional text, have nonetheless "become so embedded in the life of
the nation, so accepted by the society, so fundamental to the private and
public expectations of individuals and institutions, that the result should
not be changed now" (p. 21, quoting Robert Bork). One example of a
constitutional premise that is now embedded in the constitutional bedrock
is the idea that the privileges and immunities guaranteed against the
national government through the Bill of Rights are applicable against the
various state governments by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment. Perry
claims that although there has been some controversy as to whether the
text of the Fourteenth Amendment actually established such a practice, it is
now too late to change tacks: for better or for worse, the principle is now
part of US constitutional law.
Perry next analyses what norms were established by the Fourteenth
Amendment at the time of its passage, paying particular attention to what
values are being protected, who is being protected and from or against
what those persons are being protected. This exercise permits Perry to
construct an admittedly "complex" antidiscrimination norm that describes
the fundamental purposes of the second sentence of the Fourteenth
Amendment (p. 76). This norm forms the basis of his more specific
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investigations into whether the judicial actions in each of the areas under
discussion constitute a usurpation of legislative or executive prerogatives.
The remainder of the book contains Perry's detailed analysis of each of
the judicial controversies mentioned above. He begins with racial
segregation and affirmative action, two issues that are closely related to the
original race-related purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment, and
concludes that the Supreme Court decisions in this area were not improper.
He then moves farther afield with considerations of sex and sexual
orientation followed by abortion and physician-assisted suicide. Perry's
analytical premise is that the Supreme Court should protect the persons or
practices in question if to not do so would offend the fundamental
antidiscrimination norm posited early on. If discrimination against the set
of persons in question is contrary to the principles found within the
Fourteenth Amendment, then it is not a judicial usurpation of the other
branches' powers to overrule their actions, no matter how longstanding or
popular the discriminatory practices may be. He cites the famous education
desegregation case, Brown v. Board of Education, to demonstrate how the
Court must sometimes transcend popular prejudice and longstanding legal
practice to apply the correct constitutional principle.
Perry admits that his theory obtains results that are patently contrary
to the considerations of the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment. For
example, the historical evidence suggests that (at least most of) the authors
of that amendment did not intend its principles to apply to women.
However, Perry defends his claim that decisions forbidding discrimination
on the basis of gender were nevertheless proper by arguing, first, that the
framers might not have understood the full implications of the text they
were drafting and second, that even if the Fourteenth Amendment did not
establish the broad antidiscrimination norm that he believes it did, then
such a norm became part of the modern constitutional bedrock in the
period immediately following the second World War, when the full
implications of treating certain groups as "not truly or fully human"
became clear (p. 127).
In the end, Perry's evaluation of recent Supreme Court actions is
overwhelmingly positive. In addition to concluding that the Supreme Court
did not usurp the political branches in cases concerning racial segregation
and affirmative action, he believes that the Court acted properly in cases
involving discrimination on the basis of sex and sexual orientation and
physician assisted suicide. In fact, Perry would go even farther in cases
concerning sexual orientation, claiming that it would be improper for the
Court to fail to protect homosexuals from discrimination in any future
cases. The only issue that he believes was incorrectly decided is abortion.
Perry's book, while excellent in many ways, is not perfect. One problem
is that, by focusing on the Fourteenth Amendment in isolation, Perry is
able to analyse very complex questions as if only a single principle were at
issue. In fact, many of the situations he discusses raise several competing
principles of law: freedom of belief or association, for example, or the right
to privacy and to contract. While it is beyond his mandate to discuss all of
these issues as well as the one he has set himself, it would have been
helpful for him to identify how his reading of the Fourteenth Amendment
would respond (if at all) to competition with other constitutional values.
Still, this book is a valuable contribution to constitutional analysis and
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theory, and should provide critics of recent Supreme Court decisions with
much to consider.
S.I. STRONG
